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Abstract 
In several Arab countries, the expansion or contraction of the public economic sector 
has been correlated with the availability of liquid capital. This may be domestically- 
based (e.g. nationalizations or "agricultural squeeze") or externally-based (e.g. oil 
rents, aid and remittances). The tightening of finance also corresponds with domestic 
signals (e.g. declining revenues in the public enterprises and growing deficits in the 
state budget), and/or with external signals (e.g.from creditors, international financial 
organizations, trade partners and potential investors). The move towards privatization 
as a way of overcoming financial crises mostly takes the form of a public policy, 
initiated (sometimes in collaboration with international capital) by the State. The 
private sector may, if able, push ahead with the process. The pace and intensity of 
privatization will depend on the degree of capital accumulation and the extent to 
which both the State and the private bourgeoisie find it useful to seek autonomy from 
each other. Nine case studies suggest that the Arab State is not about to withdraw 
from the economy and that actual privatization remains quite limited. 
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Introduction 
It is perhaps fair to argue that too much etatisme in the Arab World during the period 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s has limited the effectiveness of many of the efforts in the 
field of national development. The importance of the role played by Arab governments in the 
economy and the society can be gleaned, for example, from their large share in total revenue and 
total expenditure and from the expansion in their security-related and culture-related functions 
[for details see Ayubi, 1995]. 
The reasons for this etatisme coming about have been multiple: the endeavor by new 
elites to expand their power base; the traditional prestige of public office (for a long time 
associated with the powerful foreigner); the weakness of the indigenous entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie; the strong belief in the developmental role of the bureaucracy; the importance of 
public office for building the contacts deemed necessary for pursuing private business; and 
possibly the impact of the Egyptian model, both as an exemplar and also through the role of the 
large number of Egyptian officials and teachers working in many other Arab countries. Some of 
the impetuses for bureaucratic growth were entrenched in the social and political conditions of 
the society concerned, but a particularly important cause has been the huge expansion in formal 
higher education that is not related in any way to the economic needs and manpower 
requirements of that society. 
The direction to be taken by development administration was clear: expand and 
consolidate departmental-type administration, and involve the bureaucracy in national 
comprehensive planning, in extensive industrialization programmes, in urban construction, and 
in a fast-expanding system of conventional higher education. When it was discovered - usually 
half way through - that the bureaucracy was probably ill-equipped to deal with this heavy load, 
the authorities would then declare that in order to have successful 'development administration' 
there must first be effective 'administrative development'. Since administration was regarded as 
a science that had reached its maturity in the West, administrative development became to a 
large extent regarded as an exercise in the 'transfer of technology', and 'modernization' of the 
administration was seen as the solution to most of its problems. 
By the amid-1970s it had become clear that neither the strategy of development 
administration nor the policy of administrative development that was usually followed was 
capable of dealing with the problems which, it had been hoped, they would be able to solve. 
First, concerning development administration, there was a decline in agriculture in the 
countryside; urban overcrowding, decay and a growing and frustrated lumpenproletariat; acute 
balance-of-payments problems and dependence on the outside world for finance and for 
technology; unemployment of the educated and lopsided cultural development; domination by a 
bureau-technocratic elite, and so forth. A relative growth in Gross National Product (GNP) in 
the 1950s and 1960s was soon to decline from the early part of the 1970s in most of the non-oil- 
exporting countries, while many basic needs remained unsatisfied. Secondly, in the area of 
administrative reform, the changes introduced were never completely satisfactory either to the 
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clientele or to the political leadership, so that they invariably had to be repeated, each time 
with more vigorous rhetoric but with less effective performance. 
A proposed explanation and a solution appeared here: the concepts were good but the 
application was bad (e.g., socialism was noble but its application - tatbiq - went wrong); the 
'planning' was perfect, but the 'implementation' was defective [cf. Ayubi, 1992]. However this 
merely reflected a fallacy in which the process of planning was confused with the action of 
writing a plan. Implementation cannot be separated from planning as a possible cause of failure. 
Implementation requires political support from the leadership, dedication from the lower 
administrative echelons, cooperation from the clientele or the public, and coordination at all 
levels. If mechanisms for ensuring these requirements cannot be incorporated in the planning 
process, there may very well be a case for considering this particular type of planning an 
"inappropriate technology" for this type of society at this stage of its development [cf. 
Weinstein, 1981: 116-18]. 
Although the problem of implementation is not confined to the developing countries 
(indeed much has been published on the subject in the United States since the 1970s), many 
observers believe that it is more of a complex 'problematique' in Third World countries [cf. M. 
Grindle, "Introduction" and P. Cleaves, "Conclusion", in Grindle, 1980]. This may very well 
suggest that much of the failure in implementation in the Third World is probably due to the 
irrelevance of the policies or to the plans themselves, and not simply to some casual operational 
difficulties. An analysis that would confine itself only to "obstacles to implementation" will not 
be sufficient in this case, and one's whole approach to policy and administration will have to be 
reconsidered if effectiveness is to be achieved. 
Cases of managerial, organizational and developmental success do occur in the Arab 
World and the beginning of wisdom should partly revolve around a stock-taking of such cases 
[cf. AOAS, July 1984]. In trying to learn from errors as well as from achievements, the 
following guidelines would thus be useful: (a) to see how certain arrangements fared in practice 
in the same socio-organizational environment or in one that was similar; and (b) to consider the 
possibility of broadening and generalizing these arrangements, and to determine the degree of 
their "transferability". The main point to keep in mind is that there is no single best way of 
getting things done, that 'it all depends', as the contingency proponents would have it. Rather 
than speaking resignedly of an idealized end result, and then leaving the whole exercise at that 
(perhaps in the hope that by some miracle the situation will change by itself in the desired 
direction), the emphasis should be on how to proceed, in describing the process of change itself 
and how to 'get there'. 
In short one can suggest that it is only through careful evaluation of the outcomes of 
various activities in specific and actual situations that Arabs can hope to acquire the capability 
to improve their performance. And it is such evaluation mechanisms, properly linked to action- 
oriented research, that are most lacking in the Arab World. Without evaluation, neither the 
performance of administration in general, nor the effectiveness of organizational and managerial 
reform in particular, can be assessed. 
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Institutional Restructuring in a Competitive Economic Environment 
If the period of the 1960s and early 1970s was the era of etatisme and bureaucratic 
expansion in the Arab World, the late 1970s and the 1980s were to usher in a new discourse of 
'opening up', liberalization, and privatization. Privatization programmes in the Middle East have 
not followed, however, from empirical evaluations of the performance of the public sector, nor 
have they resulted from pressures exerted by the native entrepreneurs. Rather, they represent 
mainly a public policy, carried out in response to the 'fiscal crisis of the State' and under 
pressure/temptation from globalized capitalism from its international institutions. 
The word 'privatization' itself is of course relatively new, having first appeared in an 
English dictionary in 1983. Difficult to render in the Arabic language, the concept of 
privatization was initially expressed, depending on the user's vantage point, either as 
encouraging the private sector or as selling the public sector. This, of course, is precisely what 
privatization entails, although the points of emphasis vary from one case to another. It was only 
by the end of the 1980s that Arabic coinages for the concept started to emerge: takhsisiyya, 
khawsasa, khaskhasa, not to mention the more curious terms such as tafwit (literally 'passing on' 
from the public to private sector - which is preferred in Tunisia). 
The familiar argument in favor of privatization in most of the literature is that public 
enterprises are less efficient than private ones: they are overstaffed and expensively maintained, 
and their profitability and factor productivity are low. It is claimed that part of the inefficiency 
is due to excessive political interference and/or bureaucratic regulation - but these, runs the 
argument, are necessary companions to any public sector. They delay decision, obscure 
expertise, and over-burden the firm with a number of extra-economic tasks that constrain its 
prospects for profitability [cf. e.g., Millward et al. in Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988]. Some 
escalate the argument further by saying that the public sector is not only defective in terms of 
allocative efficiency on the micro (or managerial) level, but even in terms of productive 
efficiency on the macro (or economic) level. The choice of industries in which to invest may be 
faulty (or too 'political') to start with. The intensive engagement of the State in the production 
and delivery of goods and services may also 'crowd out' private investors from such areas [e.g., 
Hastings, 1983]. This may eventually lead to lower overall levels of investment, which would 
retard rather than enhance economic development. 
Any attempt to evaluate the role of the public sector, especially in the Third World, has 
to take into account the multiplicity of objectives (economic, social and political) that it has to 
pursue, as compared to the simple profitability objective that is characteristic of most private 
enterprises. Even so, there are recorded cases of efficient public enterprises, and there are 
known cases of private monopoly whose efficiency cannot be realistically measured [cf. cases in 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988]. Some analysts accept the proposition that public enterprises were 
created to meet a mixed set of economic, financial and political objectives, but argue that "they 
have done poorly in fulfilling the first two goals and too well in fulfilling the last" [Nellis and 
Kikeri, 1989: 50 ff]. 
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The public/private, ownership-centered, dichotomy is not necessarily the key issue in 
discussing efficiency in less developed countries. Leadership and management may be more 
crucial factors. An empirical study by Robert Cunningham in which he observed a bank branch 
(private sector) and a tax bureau (public sector), of a similar size and both located in the same 
Jordanian town, has revealed interesting findings. The top managers in both organizations 
appeared in context not to live up to the pejorative image of the Arab manager. On the contrary: 
they delegate, assume responsibility, accept some participation, and 'stay out of the way'; they 
are in general 'tough on the issues and soft on the people', and they measure themselves against 
certain performance criteria. What is even more interesting, however, is that the public sector 
organization has turned out to be more flexible and rule-oriented than the private sector 
organization; which is of course a conclusion that challenges the conventional popular wisdom 
regarding the public/private dichotomy, in general and in the Arab World [Cunningham, 1989]. 
The privatization drive in the Third World is not really the result of a careful evaluation 
of either the contribution of the public sector to development, or the managerial efficiency of 
the public enterprises. Rather it is a response/reaction to the fiscal crisis of the State, reinforced 
by pressure from agencies of the international capitalist order and encouraged, to some extent, 
by international fashion (which now envelopes both the West and the East - in 'cold war' terms). 
The main factor however is the financial crisis; all the other arguments about development and 
efficiency are later additions and garnishes. 
Very few developing countries have conducted their own empirical studies on the 
performance of their own public sectors. On this subject they have, on the whole, been prepared 
to take the word of 'experts' from the industrialized countries and their international 
organizations. Take this for a telling example: the Director-General of the Arab Organization 
for Administrative Sciences (who came from 'conservative' Saudi Arabia) and his Director of 
Training (who came from 'progressive' Libya) had apparently no doubts as to the desirability of 
privatization in the Arab countries; all they were concerned about was "the circumvention of 
problems and difficulties and ... the liberalization of constraints and restrictions" in the way of 
the privatization process [Al-Saigh and Buera, 1990: 125 ff]. It is a measure of the intellectual 
dependency of these societies vis-a-vis the 'core' countries, that the former are prepared to buy 
what are frequently ideological statements sold as technical consultancies. For example, as a 
number of Arab economists have observed, the IMF-World Bank approach seems to be ---- 
"----based on a single model of development which fails to take into 
account the great variety of situations, structures and policy 
orientations in developing countries. Underlying that model is a set 
of value judgments in favor of market-oriented development and 
against government intervention in the economy. Adherence to a 
single model of development explains why Fund-supported 
programmes contain the same set of prescriptions for all countries. It 
also explains why programmes have not succeeded in achieving the 
objective of adjustment with growth----" (summarized by El-Naggar, 
1987: 6-7]. 
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In most less-developed societies, privatization which harmonizes comfortably with the 
hegemonic ideology of a really capitalist society (according to the principle of correspondence) 
would, ironically, often have to be adopted as an option by the State, and in the form of a public 
policy. Not only that; but there are some indications that 'stronger' States may be better 
privatisers. Possessing the institutional network that is necessary for any economic 
restructuring, and enjoying sufficient 'self-confidence' to make raw violence and naked 
oppression less important, a 'strong' State is probably better qualified to privatize than a 'fierce' 
State (the 'fierce' State is often violent because it is weak). Thus Turkey, Egypt and possibly 
Tunisia are probably more likely to succeed in privatization than Syria, Iraq or possibly 
Somalia. 
Organizational Modalities of Privatization 
There are three main approaches and seven main modalities for privatization [my 
terminology and taxonomy here are similar to but not identical with Eaton, 1989: 470-1J. 
(A) Managerial Approaches: 'Managerialism' often represents a prelude to, or an early 
stage of, privatization. There are two main methods here: 
1. The government does not sell publicly owned assets but it allows the boards of 
directors of para-statal corporations (appointed by the government) to act fairly independently, 
thus privatizing management and labor to a smaller or greater extent (e.g. Egypt Air, Royal 
Jordanian Airlines). 
2. The government issues some of its assets to be managed by a private entrepreneur in 
return for a fee; i.e./ 'contracting-out' (e.g. State-owned hotels and tourist organizations in 
Egypt). 
Privatization in several Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria) was often initiated 
in this 'managerialist' manner, which makes it possible to aim for higher productivity while 
remaining under the banner of 'reforming' or 'improving' the public sector. 
(B) Populist Approaches: Populist-oriented methods, of which there are two main 
varieties, enable the move towards privatization to take place without fears being aroused of an 
imminent 'capitalist takeover' of the economy: 
3. Sale of a public service or enterprise to a cooperative association. It will be recalled 
that most 'socialist' and populist regimes in the Middle East have always stipulated the existence 
of a cooperative sector alongside the State sector and the private sector, and this has assumed a 
pronounced role in certain countries and at certain times, especially in agriculture. In most 
cases the cooperatives have been closely controlled by the State (e.g. Tunisia, Syria, Egypt), 
with Algeria's secteur auto-gere representing an important semi-revolutionary (but brief) 
exception. Populist privatization often entails the transfer of real ownership to a cooperative 
association of workers, producers or consumers. Iran seems to have the most active scheme of 
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this type in the Middle East at present. Several housing, trading and agricultural projects have 
been organized in Egypt in recent years along these lines, especially by the trade unions and 
professional associations. 
4. Another method of populist privatization is through an Employees Stock Ownership 
Plan (ESOP), with entitlements to purchase stock either equitably or in relation to each 
employee's wage level. An early, but unique, example of this took place under Nasser's rule in 
the late 1960s, when employees in the State-owned Al-Ahram publishing foundation were 
allowed to buy a certain quantity of 'shares' in that corporation. Turkey has applied such plans 
more recently, and there are calls for a more extensive application of this method in Egypt, 
Libya and elsewhere. 
(C) Capitalist Approaches: In all privatization policies there is a shift of management 
from the government to non-governmental bodies. In capitalist privatization, the ownership of 
what was once publicly owned is now openly transferred, in one proportion or another, to 
whoever is prepared to buy. This may take various forms: 
5. Partial sale of publicly owned assets. This is a semi-private enterprise option and 
indeed the government may limit the sale of a public asset to 40 or 51 percent. This procedure 
has been used widely in Britain and Italy. It is particularly appealing to developing countries 
because it avoids abrupt political shock and because it is often extremely difficult to secure 
much of the local capital needed to privatize. Major political debates continue, however, as to 
whether to confine sales to certain groups or to open them to all domestic investors, and whether 
to allow foreign multinational corporations to subscribe to such enterprises. Joint ventures 
between the Egyptian public sector and foreign multinational corporations were indeed the most 
favored formula during the earlier phases of the open door policy (infitah) in Egypt. While it 
avoids a sudden reshuffling of the existing formal political coalitions at the domestic level, the 
government can claim that it is attracting new capital and management with modern know-how 
while retaining a degree of governmental and 'national' influence on the policies of the 
enterprise [compare Eaton, 1989: 475-7]. Tunisia and Iraq have also used this modality. 
6. Total privatization through the sale to the public or to an entrepreneur of all assets 
held. This option has taken place in only a few countries in the world, most notably in Chile, 
and to some extent Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, and it has often taken the form of 
restoring nationalized enterprises to their previous private owners. The process is usually 
highly political, done at least as much to settle scores as to improve productivity. In Chile, the 
action was so abrupt and disruptive that several Chilean firms had to be re-nationalized if they 
were to continue to exist [cf. Nankani, 1990: 43-5]. No such full and open privatization of large 
firms has taken place yet in the Arab world (with the partial exception of Iraq), in the sense that 
new large private enterprises have been allowed to emerge, but large previously nationalized 
enterprises have not been fully restored to private owners. Lists of likely candidates for 
privatization have been prepared in countries such as Egypt and Jordan. 
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7. A fully privatized system would see an end to all governmental monopolies and 
privileges in the field of economics and services. This is achieved either by closing down a 
government service and contracting out all its activities to the private sector, or by allowing 
private entrepreneurs to compete freely with an existing government service. It is hard to 
imagine fully privatized administration and courts without the entire concept of the State 
disappearing. But many of the activities conventionally perceived as being 'public' in some 
countries are privately owned and managed in others. This may include security-sensitive 
scientific research, foreign aid activities, supplementary prison and detention services, railways, 
transportation, posts and telecommunications, etc. [Eaton, 1989: 479-811. In many countries, 
including Middle Eastern ones, the private sector is allowed increasing competition with the 
State in providing welfare services such as education, health and social insurance. Private 
schools are known in most Middle Eastern countries and private universities have started or may 
be on their way in Sudan, Jordan, Egypt (and Lebanon). The private sector is also becoming 
increasingly active in the area of public transportation in several Arab countries. 
Restructuring Case Studies 
Egypt 
Egypt can be called in a certain sense 'the mother of Arab liberalizations'. Just as she 
was the first Arab country to champion a leading public sector during the 1950s and 1960s, she 
also became the first (with the partial exception of Tunisia) to experiment with economic 
liberalization and privatization, from the mid-1970s onwards. 
The process of privatization proceeded in a piecemeal manner and at a slow though 
growing pace, as part of the 'open door economic policy' (infitah) which was formally adopted 
in 1974. Very often it has been a function of changing emphases within the larger infitah 
policy. Initially the process implied a higher level of 'managerialism' within the public sector, 
allowing each firm to run its own affairs in a more autonomous and more economically-oriented 
fashion. Subsequently the process involved a higher level of 'commercialization' of the public 
enterprises, in the sense of making them more market-oriented and eventually more specifically 
profit-oriented.. 
Although there were several proposals during the 1980s to sell parts of the public sector 
to local investors, 'contracting out' to private companies has continued to be a more favored 
form of privatization. A specific organizational form that also became particularly important in 
the 1980s is that of joint ventures between the Egyptian public sector and foreign private 
capital. This has sometimes (for example in the hotel sector) included a separation of 
ownership from management, with the management function being delegated to a private - 
usually foreign - firm or with a certain project being leased to the private sector. 
The privatization policy reached its formal peak in 1987 with the approving in 
parliament of a new bill that made various types of divestiture possible. The new rules enable 
the government to 'hive off any loss-making public company and to sell off all public 
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companies functioning in the area of domestic trade and tourism. This was not put into practice, 
however, until the 1990s, when it became more politically feasible, in relative terms. 
Privatization in Egypt has followed a quiet, discreet approach rather than a 'big bang' 
strategy. Furthermore, although domestic capital has welcomed the new policies, and while 
international capital has encouraged it, privatization in Egypt is still basically a public policy 
pursued by the State for its own purposes. The continued dominant role of the State has meant 
that privatization has not necessarily involved deregulation but rather that it has become 
concerned with re-regulation. Thus a "public policy for investment" was created in the 1970s 
and "holding public corporations" were reintroduced in the 1980s. The continued dominant role 
of the-State has also meant that the privatization policy has not yet included any large-scale 
plans for de-manning of the public bureaucracy. 
One can thus argue that although the role of the Egyptian public bureaucracy has 
undergone several changes, such changes do not amount to a retreat by the State, as some 
observers have interpreted them [cf. e.g. Hinnebusch, 1985). The state bureaucracy is still large 
and expanding in terms of both personnel and expenditure, while the control functions assumed 
by the bureaucracy have by no means declined [cf. Ghunaim, 1986]. In the economic sphere, 
the public sector has not really given way to the private sector (except in the special case of 
commerce and finance), but the State has merely chosen to cooperate with international capital. 
This has signified a transformation of the State's role from a developmental one to a production- 
oriented one (seeking profit and cutting down on welfare activities within the joint public 
sector/international capital enterprises). However, the welfare functions of the State 
bureaucracy towards the society at large (education and health, food subsidies, etc.) have not 
been significantly curtailed, although the State has become increasingly dependent on external 
sources for financing them. 
Privatization has manifested itself in practices such as 'contracting out' and 'leasing out', 
and a few divestiture programmes are starting to emerge. However, the most favored formula 
has remained that of the joint venture between the public sector and foreign capital. Although it 
is widely believed that the factor productivity of enterprises would rise with privatization, the 
impact of the infitah policy (with its 'privatization' component) has so far been quite harmful to 
the public sector and quite negative with regard to 'development' in general [cf. Ayubi, 1990]. 
Although privatization in the sense of denationalization has not been an effective policy, 
at least to the end of the 1980s (and with the exception of tourism), privatization in the broader 
sense of a growing role for the private sector within the economy has witnessed a fairly 
significant degree of success. Much of the growth in the Egyptian economy that took place 
between 1974 and 1980 (estimated at 9 percent per annum) occurred in the private sector. The 
share of that sector in the total value added rose from 46 percent in 1973 to 55 percent in 
1981/82 [cf. S. Ahmad, 19841. The private sector (excluding foreign oil companies) accounted 
in 1985 for nearly 60 percent of GDP, one third of industrial output and perhaps as much as 
two-thirds of new industrial jobs. 
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The Gulf crisis of 1990/91, with both its negative and its positive aspects, represented a 
stimulus to go more radically for reform. On the negative side it exacerbated financial and 
economic problems and caused immediate direct losses conservatively estimated at over $4.5 
billion. On the positive side external aid (mainly grants) worth about $3.9 billion was rushed to 
Egypt in 1990/91. The USA and the Gulf states canceled some $12.9 billion worth of debts, 
including expensive American military ones. Debt servicing burdens were thus reduced by $1.3 
billion. Such unusual forgiving of debts created a more favorable atmosphere for accepting the 
'conditionality' formula required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The Agreements with the IMF, starting in May 1991, were also part of a conditionality 
exercise applied by the Club of Paris countries towards the gradual cancellation of some 50 
percent of Egypt's public debt: 15 percent on the implementation of the first agreement (May 
1991-October 1992), another 15 percent with the implementation of the second agreement 
(November 1992-April 1993), and the remaining 20 percent with the implementation of the third 
agreement (May 1993-November 1994). The IMF in its turn agreed to offer Egypt credit 
amounting to 60 percent of its contribution to the Fund but phased it, according to its 
conditionality rules, on six installments corresponding to further Egyptian reforms based on 
meeting the requirements of the IMF and the World Bank. By November 1991 a unified 
market-determined exchange rate replaced the plethora of rates that had preceded it in other 
years. 
Part of the structural reform revolves around privatization policies, and several 
important prospective privatizations were announced at a high-profile symposium on 
privatization held in September 1990 under the sponsorship of the Private Sector Commission in 
cooperation with the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The symposium was 
attended by such high-powered personalities as the Deputy Prime-minister and Minister of 
Agriculture, Yusif Wali, as well as by the ministers of Industry, of Manpower, of Scientific 
Research, and of Electricity, and by a good number of provincial governors. 
A joint public-sector/private-sector committee was formed in 1990 under the name of 
'Partners in Development' to outline the preliminary framework for privatization programmes, 
and to consider the prospective position of public sector and joint-venture companies. The 
committee agreed on dividing public enterprises into five categories: 
Joint ventures in which the public sector participates with private, domestic and foreign, 
capital. Of these companies 327 had registered losses for several years and their position had to 
be given speedy consideration. 
Partly nationalized companies, whose shares were already circulating in the stock 
market. The share of the private sector needed to be encouraged to grow in most of these 
companies. 
Companies owned exclusively by the government, which are functioning inside 
activities not compatible with, or complementary to, their main function. Such companies 
should be rationalized according to proper economic and technical criteria. 
Companies functioning in basically commercial activities, where the private sector 
should be the main actor. 
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In addition there were organizations and authorities providing public services directly 
linked to private business and commercial activities (such as the General Authority for 
International Fairs and Markets) and these should be run as market units, and access to them 
should be given to the private sector. 
An initial allocation of $300 million of American aid funds to Egypt was earmarked to 
finance the privatization programme, including arrangements for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs) in the public sector. An American consultancy group was appointed to design a 
three-year programme in cooperation with an Egyptian team. 
Egypt's privatization programme, sluggish at best on the central level, was given a big 
boost in the early 1990s at the local level. Several projects were on offer for Egyptians 
returning from the Gulf and looking for small-to medium-sized opportunities for investment. 
Most of the single projects were below LE50,000 in value, but there were some valued at 
between LEIOO,000 and LE250,000, and a few valued at over LE250,000 each. The prime 
minister, 'Atif Sidqi, agreed with the provincial governors on the sale of 1787 public projects to 
the private sector. Also considered was the sale of governorates' shares in 51 out of 78 existing 
public corporations. More than 2,000 small projects of the localities were to be sold during the 
period from 1991 to 1993. By the end of 1991 there were 1673 such projects (each valued at 
under LE50,000) that had already been sold to the private or cooperative sectors, as well as 53 
valued at over LEI00,000 each, while 192 larger projects were prepared for sale. 
A radical restructuring of the public sector was initiated in 1991 under a new and rather 
interesting law. The main feature of the Law No. 203 for 1991 concerning the so-called 'public 
business sector' (gita' al-a'mal al-'amm) is the separation of ownership and management. The 
new holding companies (sharikat qabida) and their affiliate companies (sharikat tabi'a) are no 
longer governmental bodies subject to public law but are among 'moral personalities' subject to 
private law and responsible to their own shareholders. Profits are to be distributed equally 
among private and governmental shareholders and the companies are no longer obliged to 
transfer to the state any of the previous disbursements for management, social insurance and 
welfare, etc. Companies would borrow from banks on commercial bases and would not be able 
to rely on the State budget for subsidies. Decisions on production and marketing are to be made 
by the directors and the boards of the affiliated companies. The law is applied to about 300 
companies (of which about 117 are industrial), in addition to 18 holding companies. The 
government also has significant shares in about 200 'mixed' companies subject to the investment 
law or to the companies' law. The book value of the companies subject to Law No. 203 for 
1991 was estimated in the early 1990s at about LE77 billion (of which 35 percent is in industry). 
To realize the still dominant role of the State's economic sector it is sufficient to 
compare the value of its capital with that of the private sector. The capital of large private firms 
subject to the Companies' Law No. 159 for 1981 was estimated around the same time (the end of 
1990) at no more than LE1.5 billion, whereas the capital of functioning private companies under 
the investment law No. 230 for 1987 was estimated at about LE5.9 billion, thus putting the total 
capital of all private companies at less than 10 percent of the book value of the state sector. 
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However, the age of privatization might have arrived at last in Egypt. The Technical 
Bureau for the Public Business Sector announced in Spring 1993 that hundreds of companies 
would be put up for sale, which include some exclusively state-owned companies, some 
companies with no more than a 49 percent share for the private sector (these two types are 
subject to Law No. 203 for 1991 concerning the 'public business sector'), and some 'mixed' 
companies (subject to Law No. 159 for 1981 or to Law No. 230 for 1987) in which public sector 
companies have shares of varying proportions. Joint ventures between the government sector 
and foreign capital under the investment Law No. 43 for 1974 are not on the whole being 
considered at this stage. (The multiplicity of laws is obviously confusing and there were 
proposals for unifying them into one law by the end of 1993). 
The timing and phasing out of these sales is still subject to deliberation, especially 
concerning the degree of reform to which these companies should be subjected before sale and 
whether all of them, or at least the loss-making companies, could be sold to one individual or 
only to collective shareholders, while what is particularly controversial is the proportion that 
might be sold to non-Egyptians. 
Organizationally, the cabinet ends up overseeing the whole process, with ultimate 
responsibility in the hands of the President. The Cabinet is believed to be divided, with regard 
to economic policy, into 'etatists' (e.g. the ministers of planning, industry and labor) and 
'liberalists' (the ministers for tourism, agriculture and energy). The public business sector 
(p.b.s.) was meant to have a special minister but no agreement could be reached and the prime 
minister, 'Atif Sidqi is designated as supremo in charge of supervising the process. 
In a micro-corporatist formula, four cabinet ministers (including the most outspoken 
liberalists) are joined with four leading businessmen in the 'Partners in Development' Committee 
(PDC). The ministers are Yusif Wali, secretary-general of the ruling National party and deputy- 
premier and Minister of Agriculture as leader for the PDC, the Minister of Tourism, Fu'ad 
Sultan (up to 1993), the Minister of Energy and Electricity, Mahir Abaza, and the Minister of 
Social Affairs, Amal Uthman. The private sector and the business community are represented 
by Husain Sabur, president of the Egyptian-American Businessmen's Association, 'Umar 
Muhanna, director-general of the Misr-Iran Bank, Tahir Hilmi, a law consultant, and Farid 
Khamis, a leading new-style businessman from the Tenth of Ramadan New City and a number 
of the Shura (Consultative) Council. The PDC receives external support by way of grants from 
the USAID and from the World Bank, aiming at the operationalizing of the privatization 
programme. 
The executive aspect of privatization is entrusted to the already-mentioned Technical 
Bureau for the Public Business Sector. Holding companies would have a say about the 
desirability and/or necessity and about the timing and scope of privatization within the affiliate 
companies, as their main function will be basically that of managing the financial portfolio of 
the holding company concerned and its affiliates. 
11 
The first batch of companies for sale in 1992/93 included 20 companies (worth LE9 
billion), of which 15 were fully-owned and five partly-owned by the State. Priority was given to 
companies that would not shed a lot of labor. By June 1993 assets and companies worth LE1.4 
billion had been sold, including Misroub (for soft drinks) and Egypt Chemicals. In some cases 
an ESOP was introduced, as with the United Company for Housing and Construction with 50 
percent loans being provided by the Bank of Alexandria. Immediately available for sale by 
purchase tenders were eight leading hotels and four tourist vessels, and other lists were in 
preparation. 
No holding companies would be sold, but over the following three years (1993-1996) it 
was anticipated that up to 48 percent of the number of affiliate companies, representing about 
28 percent of the total value of the public business sector, would be traded. Banks, insurance 
companies, oil companies, railways and telecommunications, the national airlines and the Suez 
Canal would not be part of the privatization drive. These corporations, whose book value is 
estimated at LE150 billion, are not part of the so-called public business sector and may therefore 
represent the main 'sacred cows' that should not, by the etatists' reckoning, be touched by 
privatizations. 
As regards privatization, it is possible to conclude by saying that, apart from the special 
case of tourism (where the earliest privatization started in the 1980s), and apart from the distinct 
case of local/agricultural projects (where privatization was relatively easy to operationalize), 
industry will continue to be a much more difficult area for large-scale privatization, mainly for 
political reasons. Although the business groups have become quite vocal, they continue to be 
rather 'junior' partners in the current informal coalition who cannot, and sometimes will not, 
push really hard for a completely liberalized industry. And although the technocrats and 
workers of State-owned industries are not as noisy nowadays as they could have been, they 
continue, objectivoiy speaking, to be major partners in that coalition. The leadership has to play 
the game of balance and mediation quite carefully between the major, silent partners and the 
junior, vocal partners. 
Tunisia 
The Tunisian case is interesting, as some of that country's privatization and 
liberalization practices pre-date even those of Egypt. At the time that Tunisia acquired its 
independence in 1956, its petite bourgeoisie, formed mainly from among the intelligentsia, was 
quite limited in size since most economic activities were dominated by colonial monopoly 
companies or by private French entrepreneurs. The process of decolonization enabled the State 
to acquire the facilities of the infrastructure (e.g. ports, railways, water and gas, some lands and 
mines), and most of the banking system was soon 'Tunisianised'. 
As the native private sector was small, and since it was perceived as being interested 
only in real estate and commercial activities, the State was soon to adopt a decidedly 
interventionist policy, later to be known as le dirigisme planifie, that attached a central role to 
the public sector while forcing the private sector towards activities regarded as complementary 
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to State action. An extensive cooperative sector was installed in agriculture, while a semi- 
corporatist organizational pattern emerged within which the Labor movement was coopted and 
the relatively large traders were forced to direct their capital towards supporting the industrial 
and the tourist sectors [AI-Mahjub, 1989: 7-8]. 
One familiar pattern was for the State to initiate investments and activities in a 
particular area to indicate the feasibility of that area and its potential reward to the private 
sector. This was especially true of the tourist sector, where all investment was public from 1962 
until 1966; the private sector was then encouraged to subscribe until, by 1970, its share in the 
tourist industry had reached 95 percent of the total (75 percent of this having originally come 
from the commercial sector). In industry, State investment was dominant, representing some 
four fifths of the total during the first ten year development plan (1962-1971), although private 
industrial investment was increasing by 8 percent per annum. The main governmental 
contribution was in areas such as fertilizers, oil refining, phosphates, and steel, with the 
government's share representing 75 percent of all investments in such relatively 'large' industries 
[Ghurbal et al., 1989: 131]. 
By contrast, the earlier agricultural cooperatives, which had formed an important aspect 
of the single ruling Constitutional Socialist Party's socioeconomic policies, were being phased 
out by the early 1970s, following the removal from power of Bin Salih and his mildly socialistic 
team and their subsequent replacement by a team that was more sympathetic to the private 
sector and to the liberalizing of the economy. The main thrust of the second ten year 
development plan (1972-1981) revolved around dismantling the cooperative sector in 
agriculture, encouraging the private sector to open up to the international market, and 
persuading foreign capital to contribute to industrial, and especially to export-oriented, 
activities. Parallel to this was a state policy that encouraged investment in irrigation and 
agricultural technology and that placed particular emphasis on the regions that produced export 
crops. In consequence, the share of public investment in agriculture increased from 13 percent 
in the period from 1971 to 1980 to 17 percent in the period from 1981 to 1986. The 1987-91 
development plan was to attach even more importance to the agricultural sector [Ait Amara, 
1987: 141-51). 
Between the end point of the first and the second development plans, the share of the 
private sector in capital formation grew from 20.6 percent to 42.2 percent, and the contribution 
of the private sector in production was to increase from 29.7 percent to 74.1 percent in 
agriculture and fisheries, from 20.7 percent to 44.5 percent in manufacturing industries, and 
from 65.6 percent to 93.4 percent in tourism. In certain industrial fields, the private sector 
became dominant, controlling 80.8 percent of textile industries, 59 percent of food industries, 
and 53 percent of mechanical industries [Al-Mahjub, 1989: 9-11; Al-Manubi, 1986: 40-41]. 
Members of the emerging entrepreneurial class that was taking up these activities had 
come originally from the field of commerce, and were able to make great use of the State's 
protective economic policies; these policies favored a certain degree of import-substitution, 
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subsidized by the state through oil revenues which, although relatively modest, represented two 
thirds of foreign currency earnings. 
However, by the end of the second ten year development plan, the early 1980s were 
witnessing serious social upheavals that drew attention to the fragility of Tunisia's economic 
system. The rate of growth of GNP (in fixed prices) declined from the previous levels of 5.2 
percent (during the first plan) and 6.3 percent (during the second), to only 2.3 percent during the 
four years from 1982 to 1986. The balance of payments deteriorated, commercial deficit grew, 
and by 1986, with the collapse in petroleum prices and a drop in tourism and agriculture, foreign 
currency reserves were nil and foreign debt amounted to $5 billion(representing 60 percent of 
GDP), while an amount of $1.2 billion was due for debt servicing. It was at this juncture that 
the State had to resort to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These 
institutions duly came to the rescue, with their never-changing diagnosis and the set formula that 
accompanies it: suppressing demand, encouraging exports, and "reducing the weight of the 
State" [Ben Romdhane, 1990: 151-9; Ghurbal et al., 1989: 134 ffl. 
At this point the State was still in control of two thirds of GDP and responsible for 
about 60 percent of all investments. In spite of the growing size of the private sector, many of 
the dirigiste policies of the State were still in place, with the government closely controlling 
prices wages, interest rates and credit policy, and with many basic commodities heavily 
subsidized. The overall role of the State was still dominant: public expenditure represented 40.6 
percent of GDP (in 1983) and public consumption represented 45.6 percent of this expenditure. 
Spending on the public administration represented 12-13 percent of GDP and salaries in turn 
represented 28.3 percent of all public expenditure [Al-Manubi, 1985]. 
Tunisia had at that time (i.e., in the mid-1980s) some 300 public enterprises (500 if the 
ones with the 'indirect' participation of the State are added), which seem to have been arranged 
in economic and technical sectors (such as metallic industries, petroleum, banks and insurance, 
transport, agriculture and so forth), rather than organized under public holding organizations (as 
is the case in many other Arab countries). The role of public enterprises was conceived of as 
being the following: the promotion of new techniques, the diffusion of development activities 
outside the traditionally favored regions, the training of personnel and the enhancing of the 
private sector [Midoun, 1985: 95-6]. The last of these objectives is quite interesting and rather 
unusual. 
As with all public sectors, however, the multitude of often contradictory objectives 
assigned to public companies was bound to have a distorting effect on their activities and to 
impose supplementary expenses that could not be tolerated in times of austerity. Economic 
profitability was modest from the outset, owing to high management costs and to the low selling 
prices necessitated both by the restricted purchasing power of the population at large and by the 
limits imposed by the government as part of its welfare policy. The financial situation of the 
public companies deteriorated steadily during the 1980s, which imposed increasingly heavy 
burdens on the State budget at a time when the State itself was unable to balance its public 
finance [Bouaouaja, 1989: 235-7]. 
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Having called for the assistance of the IMF, the Tunisian government was asked to 
embark on a 'structural adjustment' programme in return for the availability from the Fund of a 
'stand-by credit facility'. The programme required a curtailment on credit facilities, the floating 
of prices by 1991, liberalizing interests rates, removing subsidies, liberalizing imports and 
reducing protection by 1991, constraining domestic demand by freezing wages, and accelerating 
the rate of privatization in areas that were felt to have the potential to benefit from increased 
competition. A national commission was formed to oversee the transfer of about a hundred 
public enterprises to the private sector. 
Such activity paved the way for the signing of an agreement with the World Bank for 
the scheduling of the process of privatization, and the new orientation was built into the new 
(seventh) development plan of 1987-1991 through the stipulation that the private sector was to 
take a 65 percent share of all investment in manufacturing industries [Al-Mahjub, 1989: 13-14]. 
In addition, foreign industrial investment was to be given a number of inducements, including 
tax exemptions, repatriation rights and improved infrastructural and exporting facilities. In 
1986, 1987 and 1989 several pieces of legislation were enacted to govern the restructuring of 
public enterprises, a process which was to be carried out under the supervision of a specially 
formed committee with the assistance of the ministries of planning and finance as well as the 
ministries in charge of the specific enterprises concerned. 
Although several difficulties were encountered in defining a strategy for privatization, 
actual privatizations were eventually to take place in a much more significant way than has been 
the case in most other Arab countries. Three large public enterprises underwent large-scale 
restructuring that led to the privatization of most of their assets: viz. the Societe Generale des 
Industries Textiles (SOGITEX), the Societe Tunisienne des Industries et Materiaux de 
Construction (SOTIMACO), and the Societe Hoteliere et Touristique de Tunisie (SHTT). 
Smaller privatized enterprises include marble factories (Thala), cinema houses (SATPEC), 
aluminum workshops (IMAL), print houses and disc and cassette manufacturers, fisheries 
organizations, and some trading companies (the latter being sometimes liquidated and 
sometimes merged with others [Midoun, 1989: 10-12]. 
The outcome of restructuring has been quite mixed in Tunisia, with some observers 
maintaining that the overall attempt at liberalizing the economy has made greater progress than 
the denationalizing of public sector firms. This drive for liberalization has earlier origins that 
date back, as we have seen to the appointment of a business-minded Prime Minister, Hadi 
Nuwaira (1970-1980), who dominated the new endeavor to re-shape the country's economy up 
to the beginning of the 1980s. Denationalization, on the other hand, has been more closely 
associated with the IMF's 'structural adjustment' plan of the second half of the 1980s, and 
although the government's efforts in this area have been lauded by the IMF as a good model for 
other countries, privatization in Tunisia remains circumscribed within officially approved limits, 
due to the difficulties of transforming the nature of a 'patron state' within a limited span of time 
[cf. Harik, 1990]. 
15 
As might be expected, resistance to privatization does exist and can be difficult to 
overcome, although it tends to express itself in rather discreet ways: as in Egypt and Algeria it 
comes from some public sector managers but more particularly from workers and employees [cf. 
Bouaouaja, 1989: 242-6]. Indeed, workers' resistance might have been stronger had the regime 
not circumscribed the traditionally powerful trade union federation in 1986. But perhaps the 
main obstacles to privatization have been the weakness of the entrepreneurial community and 
the limited financial capacity of the private sector. Among other things, Tunisia has one of the 
smallest stock markets in developing countries. The Tunisian capitalist class revolves primarily 
around a 'familial' network of those who seek easy profits and those who avoid business risks, 
none of whom are particularly tempted to take on many of the industrial concerns that are on 
offer [Midoun, 1989: 12-13; Harik, 1990: 11 ff]. 
The private sector has in fact developed 'under the shadow' of the quasi-rentier Tunisian 
State and has become extremely dependent on government protection and subsidy. This was 
made very evident as soon as the 're-structuring' programme was put in motion, when in 1987 
nearly four hundred private firms and in 1988 nearly seven hundred speedily went bankrupt or 
had to close down. This situation was made worse by the rapid and abrupt liberalization of 
imports, and the concurrent rise in interest rates, the devaluation of the dinar by 60 percent, and 
the rise in the cost of imported equipment. Voices were therefore heard once again calling for a 
reconsideration of the full-fledged privatization drive and for a renewed emphasis on improving 
the capacity and productivity of the public enterprises [cf. Mahjub, 1990: 305-10]. 
The Tunisian experiment represents an interesting case of applying the short-term 
teachings of the IMF and the middle-term strategies of the World Bank. "Instead of negotiating 
through the interminable meetings of the Paris Club like some of its neighbors, Tunisia took the 
initiative and deliberately set out to incorporate the thinking of its foreign creditors in its 
planning strategy. For Western bankers Tunisia is again a model country, demonstrating 
exemplary prudence in the management of its economic affairs" [Moore, 1988: 180]. However, 
Tunisia cannot yet speak of a privatization 'success story' as long as its private entrepreneurs 
continue to shy away from industrial enterprises, which are still - in turn - partly coveted by the 
State bourgeoisie. Furthermore, Tunisian economic liberalization is still fraught with political 
risks. Although the emasculation of their Federation has meant that direct workers' resistance 
was not particularly noteworthy, the political liquidation of the Habib Ashur group within the 
Federation has meant that the regime no longer has a safety valve among the workers [ibid.: 
187]. 
Syria 
Syria's small public sector, which emerged through nationalization during the 1958- 
1961 union with Egypt, was greatly expanded when a Ba'thist coup d'etat in 1963 removed the 
anti-union junta from power, and when a more radical wing of the Ba'th seized the reins of 
government in 1966. By the mid-1960s the State owned all banks, most trade and much of 
commerce, controlled agricultural cooperatives, and possessed 80 percent of all industry. A 
large number of public organizations and public companies were formed and the public sector's 
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share in domestic production rose from 25 percent to 75 percent. The legal position of the 
public sector was further regulated, following the Ba'thist 'corrective' coup of 1970, by various 
pieces of legislation, especially those issued in 1974 and 1980 [Sa'ud and 'Ali, 1986: 442-88]. 
As in most other populist regimes, industrial and agricultural projects are not viewed from a 
strictly technical or economic point of view. The mere installation of a project is a political 
objective in itself, providing 'modern' employment opportunities, disbursing wages and salaries 
and highlighting the presence of the State. 
Industrial development escalated with the rise in oil revenues between 1973 and 1980, 
after which many projects started to face serious financing problems. Fixed capital formation 
saw a big jump in 1974 and 1975, slowed down again between 1975 and 1980, picked up gently 
until 1985, and then receded rapidly from 1986 on. It is not at all difficult to correlate these 
movements with fluctuations in foreign aid loans, and to realize the close dependence of 
domestic investment on foreign financing [Hilan, 1989: 32]. 
During the first half of the 1980s, several negative indicators were showing up. A 
declining growth rate started to dip into negative figures in 1984. Average levels of worker 
productivity within the economy were declining. In the meantime, imports had not declined, 
exports did not increase, and informal trade (imports smuggling) remained quite high. Such 
trends continued into the second half of the 1980s, further complicated by a proportional decline 
in the contribution of the commodity sector to GDP, and by growing budgetary and trade 
deficits [Dalila, 1989: 409-11 ]. 
Various complex interactions have become increasingly the norm since the guarded 
move towards a certain policy of relaxation (inflraj) in 1970 and towards a policy of limited 
opening-up (infitah) in 1974. These cautious reforms "are marked by a combination of more 
flexible market mechanisms and intense State planning, since the State controls both water and 
credit, and the private sector holds almost 80 percent of the cultivated land" [Leca, 1988: 191- 
2]. 
A certain kind of 'specialization and division of labor' seems to have established itself 
between a public sector that concentrates on modern technology, large-scale import-substituting 
industry and basic products, and a private sector that concentrates on commodity and service 
activities that are closer to the consumer, with fewer workers and higher profitability. On paper, 
the private sector appeared to be quite modest. In 1979, for example, there were 36 thousand 
companies employing fewer than ten workers, and 300 companies employing more than ten 
workers. Their production was quite humble, but there were probably some statistical problems 
involved in accounting for their activities [Dalila, 1990: 400-1]. There is no doubt, in any case, 
that the number of private projects has escalated most speedily since the late 1980s and that the 
value added is very much higher in the private than it is in the public sector [ibid.: 402-11]. 
The relationship between the State and the entrepreneurs of the private sector need no 
longer be antagonistic: indeed with infitah it is almost a relationship of alliance, provided that 
the entrepreneurs do not step severely out of line. 
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Syria's reliance on external financing reached problematic dimensions by the mid- 
1980s, to the extent of seriously delaying the sixth development plan (1986-1990), as State 
revenues were running short and external sources were not forthcoming in amounts that could 
cover the government's investment commitments. Such developments resulted in a situation 
where Syria's debt had reached $4.9 billion in 1988/89, representing 22.2 percent of its GNP, 
with the debt service representing 16.2 percent of the country's export of goods and services 
[ABC, 1990]. 
A retrenchment policy was adopted within the public sector, and domestic and joint 
private capital were encouraged, especially in the fields of agriculture, food industries and 
tourism, to relieve part of the financial responsibilities of the State. Various joint ventures were 
formed with a State contribution not exceeding 25 percent of their capital, with 75 percent of the 
capital owned by domestic, Arab or foreign investors. One such company was the Syrian Arab 
Company for the Development of Agricultural Products which was owned 75 percent: 25 
percent by the private and the public sector respectively. Several financial, monetary and 
taxation facilities and organizational exemptions have been given to such companies to 
encourage their expansion. However, as with Iraq, the regime has not to date felt the need either 
to call in the IMF or to push towards full economic liberalization (even though the Syrians could 
not count on the same large oil resources as in Iraq). But although the regime has not declared 
any impressive-sounding privatization programmes, the Syrian private sector is both more 
dynamic and more structurally interlinked with the public sector than its Iraqi counterpart, and 
therefore a de facto privatization process could be said to have been taking shape for a number 
of years. It is true that the share of the private sector in investments in 1987 (43 percent) is not 
nominally much higher than it was in 1973 (41 percent), but there are indications that the value 
added per each employee as well as capital productivity in general are on the increase in the 
private sector, whereas they are declining in the public sector [Longuenesse, 1985]. 
A defacto privatization appears to have served the interests of the regime for a number 
of years, but a more formalized, if still careful, approach towards the fostering of private 
investments is now in place, following the issue of Law No. 10 of May 1991 for the 
encouragement of 'productive investment'. 
Iraq 
The emergence of the public sector in Iraq, following the anti-monarchical coup of 
1958, was basically motivated by political reasons such as the need to eradicate the economic 
base of the elite associated with the ancien regime, and was to a large extent influenced by the 
Nasserist model. Significant nationalizations in 1964 transferred to the State the ownership of 
about thirty important factories of cigarettes, building materials, food industries, textiles and 
leather, and nationalized all banks and insurance companies. However, up till 1973 the growth 
of the public sector remained rather slow and limited. It was the successive nationalizations of 
various processes of petroleum extraction (between 1972 and 1975), combined with the 
quadrupling of oil prices around the same time, that was to result in the great expansion of the 
Iraqi public sector, since the State was now in charge of over half, and eventually (in 1977), of 
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80 percent of the national GDP, as well as being in possession of the main sources of economic 
surplus in the society. In this same year, 1977, there were about 400 public sector enterprises, 
employing 80,000 workers and absorbing 60 percent of all industrial and commercial investment 
[Khajfaji, 1983: 25-33]. 
Iraqi industrialization was therefore closely related to a 'mineral base' (oil), which gave 
the expansion of the economic role of the State features that are quite similar to those obtaining 
in other oil-exporting countries of the Gulf. More specifically, this industrialization was very 
much related to a limited number of 'grand projects' in the area of 'industrializing industries' - 
i.e., heavy industries, closely tied to the almost free supply of oil and gas, rather externally- 
oriented, and with "little connection with the overall economic and social life of the country" [S. 
Amin, 1982: 86-7, 139-46]. Despite the seemingly high priority attached by the official 
development policy to import-substitution, the results remained rather modest as far as self- 
sufficiency is concerned. The industrialization model of the oil boom period involved "a 
combination of big capital-intensive and export-oriented industries, and the strategy tied the 
Iraqi development to the capitalist world market. Put differently, the Iraqi industrialization of 
the 1970s meant growing dependency on the transnational companies because of their supplies 
of turnkey plants and numerous contracts within management, services and marketing" [Olsen, 
1986: 27]. 
By the early 1980s not only was the public sector predominant within these 'strategic' 
big industries, but it almost monopolized foreign trade and continued to play an important role 
in domestic trade and owned the banking, insurance and financial services [Al-Sayyid 'Ali, 
1989: 27-31]. By 1987, as much as 96 percent of the industrial workforce was employed in 
State-owned factories, which produced more than 84 percent of total industrial output 
[Chaudhry, 1991: 15-16]. This is not to suggest, however, that the private sector has been 
absent from the economic scene. An Iraqi lnfitah with regard to agriculture took place quite 
early on. The fairly extensive 'agrarian reform' implemented in the early 1970s was soon to be 
reversed, around 1978, with the liquidating of most collective farms and the phasing ut of 
several agricultural cooperatives; and in 1983 a law was enacted that permitted the private rent 
of unlimited acreages of public land [cf. Springborg, 1986: 33-521. Credit and infrastructural 
facilities were given to the private sector, Iraqi and Arab, to stimulate investment and 
mechanization, and independent production and marketing activities were allowed. 
Al-Khafaji maintains that by 1986 the share of the private sector in GDP (excluding oil, 
defense and administration) has reached 64 percent, its share in construction being 94 percent, 
in transportation 76 percent and in commerce 44 percent [Al-Khafaji, 1986b]. Such figures may 
be somewhat exaggerated. Farhang Jalal, another Iraqi economist more sympathetic to the 
private sector, maintains that the only activities conceded by the State to the private sector prior 
to 1987 had only concerned very secondary fields such as excavating rubble and sand and 
manufacturing some refreshments [F. Jalal, 'Comment' in Al-Nasrawi et al., 1990: 365-6]. 
Based on a more comprehensive set of figures, yet another Iraqi economist, 'Abd al-Mun'im al- 
Sayyid 'Ali, reports that in 1987 the share of the public sector in GDP (including oil) was 83.9 
percent compared to 16.1 percent for the private sector. Excluding oil, the former's share 
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amounted to 61 percent of GDP and the latter's to 39 percent thereof (being particularly high in 
areas such as transport: 77.7 percent; and commerce: 60.1 percent). In the same year, the public 
sector was responsible for 76 percent of total fixed capital formation, compared to 24 percent 
for the private sector [Al-Sayyid 'Ali, 1990: 350]. 
Whatever the case may be, such figures should not give one a false sense of the 
structural strength of the private sector, for the State has continued to maintain its grip on the 
economy and the society through its monopoly of the utilization of the oil revenues (the 
petroleum industry accounting for 55-60 percent of GDP), and through its control of the civil 
and military apparatus (one out of every three urban Iraqis is publicly employed) and most 
particularly the party/security machine. And although the oil revenues had more than halved 
during the war years with Iran (from their peak of $26.5 billion in 1980), they remained quite 
handsome indeed, and enabled the State to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy from the 
domestic social classes. As in Algeria, this is a case of the private sector being assigned a role 
by the State. The government had no intention of relinquishing economic (much less political) 
power, but hopes to streamline the existing system. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming proportion of the private sector has remained closely 
tied to the State and/or vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign trade and foreign politics. Lacking 
strong structural linkages with the rest of the economy, the private sector continued to be 
critically dependent on the State. By the beginning of 1988 virtually all of Iraq's agricultural 
production and several food processing industries had been privatized. But the non-agricultural 
private sector was not particularly in a hurry at this stage to press for full autonomy from the 
State, nor was the State particularly anxious to push vigorously in that direction. Although 
some subsidies were reduced and benefits constrained, the State did not want to cut down 
severely on the levels of welfare, especially during the politically sensitive war years. Only a 
mild privatization programme was therefore implemented during the years of war with Iran. 
Serious privatization began in 1987 and gained momentum in 1988 after the cease-fire 
with Iran. It involved consolidation of the privatization drive in agriculture, the sale of very 
large poultry, dairy and fisheries enterprises, and divestiture to the private sector of a number of 
factories for food processing, textiles, construction materials, transport and services. It also 
included the elimination of state monopoly on the importation of consumer goods, an export 
earnings retention scheme for industrialists, and a new foreign investment law that provided 
greater incentives for Arab investment in Iraq (while still officially prohibiting exclusive non- 
Arab foreign investment). A second State-owned commercial bank, Al-Rashid Bank, was 
established in 1989 to introduce competition for Al-Rafidain Bank, though further liberalization 
of the country's financial sector was still to be put into solid form. Tax exemptions and credit 
facilities were increased and several restrictions with regard to capital and employment were 
eased out. 
As a Ba'th party document declared, there was no longer a need for Iraq to be a "State of 
small shops and stores" (dawlat dakakin) [in Al-Sayyid 'Ali, 1989: 401. The State was perceived 
to be more successful in the area of manufacturing industries, where cheap energy and the 
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expanding technocratic elite were contributing to a more effective performance [ibid.: 58]. 
Rather than retreating, the State was actually endeavoring to free itself from what the leadership 
came to regard as minor economic pursuits in order to concentrate on larger, more strategic 
projects in iron and steel, engineering, arms and petrochemicals [cf. ABC, 1990: 42-5]. The 
same observer who was impressed by the scale and speed of privatization had to admit that 
"dramatic as they appear, though, the reforms of the 1980s did not signal a fundamental change 
in the balance between public and private shares in the economy outside agriculture. The state's 
share in manufacturing kept pace due to large investments in heavy industry ... At no point did 
the state's share of industry fall below 76 percent" [Chaudhry, 1991: 15]. 
The State had not retreated but had simply changed its order of priorities in the 
economic sphere. The private sector was being assigned a role by the State: this was divestiture 
without marketization. 
In 1987 the labor union, which included public and private sector workers, was 
dissolved. Public enterprise workers became 'employees' in the public service, which was 
presumably undergoing an 'administrative revolution' and shedding some of its senior personnel. 
Private sector workers belonging to firms with over 50 workers each (only 8 percent of the 
industrial working force) could form unions but in reality they were too weak to do so, 
especially with available competition from 'less-demanding' Egyptian and other non-Iraqi 
workers and from nearly a quarter of a million soldiers returning from the war with Iran [cf. 
Lawson, 1990: 32-51; Chaudhry, 1991: 15-18; M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett, 1990: 22-3]. 
The relatively significant debt to international banks and governments accumulated by 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war, (amounting to just under $15 billion and representing 29.2 percent 
of GNP, with debt service representing 50 percent of exports), was regarded as a serious but 
temporary condition that did not warrant resorting to the IMF [ABC, 1990: 40]. Additional 
unquantified liabilities due to Arab governments (estimated by some at $40 billion) included an 
obligation to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to repay 'war relief crude sold by these two countries on 
behalf of Iraq from 1983 to 1988. However, the continuation by the regime of its large-scale 
industrial and military investments (not to speak of war damage repairs and welfare 
expenditures) at a time of relatively low oil prices and at a juncture when several Western 
quarters were terminating their credit to Iraq, had combined to produce a rather desperate 
foreign exchange shortage. By the early months of 1990, the economy of Iraq had passed the 
stage of deterioration to reach that of collapse [Parisot, 1990: Picard, 1990: 26-7] - a condition 
that contributed in a major way to the Gulf crisis of 1990/1991. 
Jordan 
In spite of adopting a formally 'open' and 'liberal' economic policy, the government's 
involvement in the Jordanian economy has been very substantial. In addition to a highly 
controlled pricing and subsidization policy, many economic activities, including those of the 
private sector, have been closely regulated by the State, and Jordanian industrial activity has 
been mainly initiated by the government. Additional public expenditures have turned the 
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population in a few decades (and in spite of extremely high population growth rates) from a 
predominantly illiterate into a largely literate one, and have raised the level of public utilities 
and general services (including housing, electricity, health, communications, etc.) to fairly high 
standards [Al-Sha'ir, 1990: 636-8]. 
Such a need to consolidate the socioeconomic base of Jordan became more critical 
following the series of disruptions that were connected with the Israeli occupation of the (richer) 
West Bank and with the consequent rapid increase in Jordan's Palestinian population and all the 
social and political implications that this development was to bring about. The strengthening of 
a centralized management of the economy expressed itself in the adoption of a series of 
development plans. A three year plan (1973-1975) was launched with the specific aim of trying 
to revitalize the economy after the damage caused by the Six Day War and its aftermath, and 
this was followed by a series of five year plans, starting in 1976-80, which had more ambitious 
objectives. In this and the following (1981-1985) plan the government favored the commodity- 
producing sectors, especially in light and medium-scale industries such as timber processing, 
metal works, domestic appliances and building materials. The outcome of such a policy has 
been that in recent years budget expenditures have averaged 40-50 percent of GDP annually, 
reflecting investments in industry and the infrastructure, price subsidies, and also large defense 
and security charges [ABC, 1990: 50-1 ]. Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased 
from less than 31 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to around 55 percent during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. The share of planned public investment in total gross fixed-capital formation 
averaged 46 percent in the period 1970 to 1990, reaching a peak of 55 percent in the mid-1980s. 
In institutional terms, such activities have resulted in the emergence of a significant 
public sector that includes some 40 public organizations functioning in the areas of natural 
resources (mainly phosphates), industry, metallics and electricity, agriculture, electricity, 
transport and communications, housing and tourism, as well as trade, supplies and finance. 
Whereas some of these organizations were totally owned by the State, others had a government 
share of over 50 percent of capital and therefore their management was government-controlled 
[Abu Shikha, 1983; Abu Shikha and 'Assaf, 1985: Ch. 6]. Although agriculture has on the 
whole declined (owing to the loss of the fertile West Bank, population pressures and drought 
conditions), the government's involvement in agricultural affairs has increased through the role 
of the Jordan Valley Authority (which was subsequently merged with the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation), and the role of the Jordan Cooperative Organization, which was boosted after the 
mid-1970s [Adwan and Cunningham, 1988: 3; Gubster, 1988: 105]. 
The growth in the economic role of the State has been closely contingent upon the post- 
1973 oil boom in both direct and indirect ways, to the extent that some have described Jordan as 
the world's main "non-oil-producing oil economy" [ABC, 1990: 51 ]. During much of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, some four-fifths of gross domestic expenditure was estimated to have derived 
from direct grants and budget support loans from the neighboring oil-exporting countries, from 
remittances from Jordanians working in the Gulf, and from Jordanian exports to the neighboring 
oil-rich countries. Over one third of the Jordanian labor force was employed in the Gulf, and 
the remittances from these individuals were equivalent to almost two thirds of Jordan's total 
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revenues from exports of goods and non-factor services. Budget support by Gulf countries was 
usually equivalent to about half the government's revenues in the period from the late 1970s to 
1983. And Jordan's exports to Arab countries represented on average about half of the country's 
total merchandise exports [Anani and Khalaf, 1989: 2111. Jordan is therefore highly vulnerable 
to economic and political developments in the Gulf, a fact that was made most tragically 
obvious during the Gulf war of 1990/91. 
The momentum of economic activity during most of the 1980s was maintained by a 
much higher level of government expenditure, which was heavily financed by external and 
domestic borrowing, and which resulted in a net budget deficit that rose from 9 percent of GDP 
in 1984 to 18 percent in 1987. Although relatively buoyant tourism, a considerable expansion in 
the banking services resulting from the disruptions in Beirut, and the side-benefits of the re- 
export trade with Iraq during its war with Iran, had all somewhat ameliorated the situation, the 
overall decline in revenues as a consequence of the uncertain conditions in the Gulf had resulted 
in a rapid increase in Jordan's external indebtedness, from $2.5 billion in 1984 to an estimated 
$6-$7 billion in 1988. Debt represented 92 percent of GDP and debt service represented 24.6 
percent of exports, while there were signs that GDP itself was declining in absolute terms. 
Foreign exchange reserves also declined during the same period from $515 million in 1984 to 
$110 million in 1988. 
Jordan's financial situation reached crisis proportions in 1988, necessitating emergency 
austerity programmes and prompting the country to resort, rather desperately, to the 
International Monetary Fund. The thinking on the subject of privatization emerged within the 
context of this dramatic financial crisis and in the absence of any indicators that its reversal was 
imminent. Government officials considered that revitalizing the role of the private sector would 
be a way of relieving the State of some of its heavy financial commitments, and the argument in 
due course surfaced that the private sector was more rational and that privatization and 
efficiency were two sides of the same coin [cf. Adwan and Cunnigham, 1988]. 
The public sector's largest holding in absolute and relative terms is in mining, where 
total public investments amount to 58 percent of the capital of mining companies and represent 
almost one half of total public shareholding in Jordanian corporations. The highly capital- 
intensive nature of mining companies and the perception that naturally occurring minerals are a 
national resource may not render this area particularly amenable to speedy privatization. The 
second largest area of government participation is in the manufacturing sector, where the 
government contribution reaches 23.2 percent of the sector's capital, with 87 percent of public 
shares being held in the four largest companies: the Jordan Cement Factories, the Jordanian 
Petroleum Refinery, the Glass Industries, and the Engineering Industries. The subscribed 
capital of these four companies represents 56 percent of the total capital of all 48 manufacturing 
companies in the country. In services, average public investment amounts to 20.8 percent of the 
total capital of service companies [Anani and Khalaf, 1989: 211-17]. 
Pure public enterprises and public-private joint ventures vary widely in terms of 
productivity and efficiency, and it is not clear to what extent this criterion will be among the 
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ones used for targeting projects for privatization. Among the exclusively public institutions, the 
Telecommunications Corporation and the Electricity Authority are usually considered 
profitable, whereas the Water Authority incurs planned losses for 'equity' purposes. Within the 
mixed enterprises, some experts believe that "the higher the government participation, the 
higher the probability of having a loss-making industry. In fact, 58 percent or more of these 
companies were loss-makers in 1986. The comparable figure for enterprises with less than 35 
percent public ownership was only 26 percent" [Anani and Khalaf, 1989: 215-17]. Privatization 
proposals have been put forward for both profitable corporations (e.g., Telecommunications), 
and loss-making ones (e.g., Transportation) [Adwan and Cunningham, 1988: 5-8]. Since 1986, 
when privatization was declared as a desirable objective, several studies and preparations have 
been carried out but no actual transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector has 
taken place. Three enterprises have in particular been identified as targets for privatization: 
Royal Jordanian Airlines, the Public Transport Corporation, and the Telecommunications 
Corporation. But actual implementation has so far not progressed beyond focusing on the 
commercialization of public enterprises as a preparatory step for the eventual transfer of 
ownership and control. 
Differently from some other Middle Eastern countries, the pattern of government 
investment in Jordan did not cause a 'crowding-out' of the private sector. The State's 
concentration on services, utilities and the infrastructure and, within industry, on mining and 
mineral industries, as well as the widespread practice of joint public-private ventures in 
manufacturing and engineering industries, combined with the fact that the private sector and the 
State were both simultaneously receiving (in their different ways) 'surrogate oil revenues' - all 
these factors have helped in creating a situation where the public and the private sectors have 
complemented (rather than competed with) each other. This policy was also conducive to the 
political cohesion of Jordan, creating as it did common economic grounds between the 
predominantly Transjordanian bureaucratic bourgeoisie on the one hand and the predominantly 
Palestinian commercial bourgeoisie on the other. 
Yet the equal reliance of the private sector on externally-derived revenues as well as its 
close partnership with the State in many activities would also suggest that the private sector may 
not be capable of picking up the slack that is resulting from the decline in both official and 
private transfers to Jordan, and from the closely-related reduction in the economic role of the 
State. It should also be remembered that many of the larger private sector enterprises 
(phosphates, oil-refining, potassium, cement, electricity and tobacco) are regis (sharikat 
imtiyaz), or companies by privileged appointment (i.e., private monopolies). In 1987 these 
companies realized 64.8 percent of all value added in the industrial sector. They do receive 
much governmental protection and support, and are not subject to the usual business accounting 
and control procedures, and it is difficult therefore to predict the efficiency of their performance 
under more 'normal' market conditions [Al-Sha'ir, 1990: 640]. 
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Algeria 
With the coming of Algerian independence in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella, the country's 
first president, introduced self-management in agriculture and in industry as the basis of his 
country's economic policy. However, as a result of his removal from power through a military 
coup led by Boumedienne in June 1965, Ben Bella's model did not last long. Under the regime 
of President Boumedienne, implementation of the country's economic policy began with the 
institutionalizing of socialist planning and the setting up of large state enterprises - the societes 
nationales. The major enterprises, which can be described as the backbone of Algeria's 
industrial sector, included SONATRACH (in the field of hydrocarbons), SNS (steel), 
SONACOME (engineering), SONALEC (electrical), and SNMC (building materials). There 
were also some other rather smaller state enterprises such as, among others, SNMetal (metal- 
work); SONITEX (textiles), SONALGAZ (domestic gas and electricity supplies), NIPEC 
(leather work and footwear), and SONATOUR (tourism). These were 'minor' in the sense that 
they played somewhat of a secondary role in the scale of priorities that the planning model had 
set, and in the allocation of investment resources which had been concentrated in the five major 
branches of industry. Complementary activities that remained in the control of the State 
included a total monopoly on foreign trade and on banking and insurance. One may infer from 
this overall picture that the State was convinced of the need to have the Algerian economy 
firmly under its control [cf. Bouattia, 1993]. 
However, under the pressure of growing financial burdens Algeria, like other countries 
in the region, became part of the wave of economic liberalization and privatization that swept 
across the Arab World during the 1980s [cf. Sutton and Aghrout, 1990]. After President Chadli 
Bin Jadid had taken over, the country underwent a ten year period of political, and more 
particularly, of economic reforms. These reforms reversed the earlier policies that had favored 
State capitalism based on a development strategy of heavy "industrializing industries" and on 
gigantisme. In their place a rehabilitated version of the earlier and much constrained private 
sector of the economy was allowed to emerge, while a restructuring and subdividing of the 
dominant state industrial societes nationales was put in train [Osterkamp, 1982]. In Algeria's 
agricultural sector, the large self-managed or 'collective' estate farms and producer cooperatives 
that had emerged from two agrarian reform programmes were restructured and reduced in size. 
Politically, the progressive replacement of members of Boumedienne's government by 
more pragmatic FLN ministers during successive Chadli administrations encouraged an 
increasing liberalization that culminated in the introduction of a multi-party political system in 
1989, and in the opening up of the Algerian economy to foreign investment in 1990. 
Largely because of the constraints imposed by the 1966 Code des Investissements, the 
private industrial sector had stagnated throughout the 1970s. In 1982 a new investment code 
was issued that aimed at restoring private initiative through mobilizing savings and providing 
guarantees, credits and tax advantages. While heavy 'strategic' industry was retained within the 
State sector, private investment was encouraged in areas such as light manufacturing, craft 
industries and hotel infrastructure, and a third decentralized industrial sector that was supported 
and managed by the local wilayat authorities was also promoted. By 1982, this emerging 
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private sector accounted for some 30 percent of industrial workers who were dispersed among 
4800 small and medium-sized enterprises, most of which employed between five and twenty 
workers only. 
The creation in 1982 of the Office National pour l'Orientation, le Suivi, et la 
Coordination de l'Investissement Prive (OSCIP) also gave further encouragement to, as well as 
some control over, private industrial investment. Large private industrial projects whose 
investments exceeded 3 million dinars, required approval from OSCIP's Commission Nationale 
d'Agrement (CNA) based in Algiers, while smaller projects could be approved by local 
Commissions d'Agrement de Wilaya (CAW). In the period from 1983 to 1987 OSCIP approved 
5186 investment projects, of which 1181 were in the larger-capital CNA sector. The private 
capital that was to be invested in this way averaged 2.6 billion dinars annually between 1983 
and 1985, increasing to 3.7 billion dinars in 1986, and to 6.9 billion dinars in 1987. About 44 
percent of this was to go into industrial manufacturing projects from 1983 to 1986, with the 
transport, tourism and services sector ranking second and the construction materials sector 
ranking third during the same period, while all the projects approved by OSCIP up to the latter 
part of June 1987 would create 75,446 new jobs in this burgeoning private sector. By 1988/89, 
the regulations concerning private investment had been liberalized still further. At this point the 
regulatory role of OSCIP was done away with and with it went an interesting accumulation of 
investment statistics. 
From 1980 the Chadli government had concluded that the State industrial sector was 
constrained both by vertical integration and by bureaucratic concentration deriving from the 16 
large industrial societes nationales that collectively accounted for some 80 percent of industrial 
activity in Algeria and which employed 311,680 people. Accordingly a major reorganization 
was undertaken with the aim of breaking up the unwieldy organizations into much smaller 
enterprises nationales, each one of which would be more specialized in clearly-defined 
production activities that would usually separate the functions of production, distribution and 
marketing. The iron and steel complex SNS was therefore divided up into 13 enterprises, and 
the wide-ranging SONACOME engineering was split into 11 enterprises. Likewise the 16 
industrial societes were subdivided into 107 enterprises. It was estimated that the restructuring 
of the wider group of some 35 to 39 state societes, including commercial, financial and transport 
organizations, produced anything from 322 to 500 enterprises after subdividing had taken place. 
While it was not a privatization exercise as such, the restructuring involved a great deal of 
decentralization to regional units and resulted in a more flexible and less concentrated state 
industrial sector with which private industry could liaise and do business [Sutton and Aghrout, 
1990 and refs. cited]. 
In the early 1990s the Algerian public enterprise sector consisted of approximately 350 
national and 2500 provincial and communal enterprises. The important provincial and 
communal state-owned enterprises sector was undergoing consolidation (with World Bank 
support) as a first step towards improving performance. More extensive and advanced reforms 
were proceeding in the national state-owned enterprises sector, with the aim of putting the 
public and the private sectors on an equal legal and regulatory footing when engaged in the 
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same field of activity, and in order to make the state-owned enterprises conform to the 
requirements of the national commercial code (from which they had previously been exempt). 
The budgetary burden of the national state-owned enterprises sector having been 
recognized since the early 1980s, a few of the largest and most concentrated state-owned 
enterprises (including the hydrocarbon giant SONATRACH) were, as has already been noted, 
functionally and geographically decentralized, while the second phase of reform concentrated 
on sorting out the arrears (cross-debts) situation between parent companies and their 
subsidiaries. Enterprise restructuring was not particularly successful initially, but it was 
claimed that the effectiveness of future rehabilitation efforts would be improved by alterations 
to the system of taxing the enterprises. 
Most recent reforms have concentrated on clarifying the relationship of the government 
to the national state-owned enterprises, and on putting the management of the public companies 
at a distance from the intervention of sectoral ministries. This has been done through eight 
Fonds de Participation - Participation or Shareholding Funds. These publicly-owned and 
operated Funds which were intended to act as holding companies, would each hold shares in a 
diversified portfolio of state-owned enterprises, and their mandate would be to buy or sell 
shares, and to invest or to disinvest their holdings, with the aim of maximizing their profits. 
Trading of shares would be permitted among the Funds and between the state-owned 
enterprises themselves, as the first steps towards the development of a capital market. (At this 
stage private ownership of the existing state-owned enterprises portfolio was not envisaged). 
Early in 1990, however, the National Assembly authorized new joint ventures between 
state enterprises and private capital, foreign or domestic (although state-owned enterprises were 
not excluded from the stipulations of this new legislation it seemed to be aimed mainly at newly 
established firms or at existing privately-owned firms). Each of the Funds would receive an 
initial allocation of a substantial minority of shares in a specific industrial sub-sector, but no 
single Fund would own more than 40 percent of the shares of any one firm. In this way 
ownership of every enterprise would be spread among at least three Funds, which would 
monitor enterprise performance and enforce profitability standards. The aims of the Funds 
would be to stimulate competitive market forces, to reduce political and administrative 
interference in the day-to-day functioning of the firms, to provide enterprise management with 
profit-maximization signals and the autonomy to achieve these goals, and generally to increase 
the operational efficiency of the enterprise concerned [cf. Lee and Nellis, 1990]. 
The Algerian Participation Funds came into existence officially in the middle of 1989, 
and the initial steps towards transformation involved the formation of an agency that advised on 
how each enterprise could be placed on a firmer financial footing. Debts were split into several 
categories: those owed to the Treasury were converted into quasi-equity, those to investment 
banks were mainly written off, and most owed to commercial banks were rescheduled. Firms 
were categorized according to those that had positive and negative net worth and cash flow, and 
enterprises scoring negatively on these financial criteria were not passed on to the Funds. Each 
enterprise was assigned a value in terms of the number of shares that would be issued for each 
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firm and at this point the enterprises were handed over to the Participation Funds. Fund 
managers were then put in place but it appeared initially that the Funds (with around 30 
enterprises per existing staff member) were understaffed, and operating procedures had still to 
be determined. It was anticipated that the Funds would have the power to appoint enterprise 
Boards of Directors but it was not very clear how enterprise performance standards would be 
set, monitored and enforced. 
The parameters of managerial autonomy had also to be specified, though it was 
expected that managers would be able to hire and fire employees. Pricing was somewhat 
liberalized, but in view of the monopoly structure of the Algerian economy, margins were to 
remain controlled. Access to foreign currency remained severely constrained, but some 
progress was made in tightening up on the allocation of domestic credit as one of the moves 
towards the eventual imposing of a hard budget constraint. At the beginning of the 1990s none 
of the national state-owned enterprises had been liquidated, despite the fact that they were now 
subject to the commercial code which allowed for closures, while Algeria's current political 
difficulties are distracting the leadership and deflecting from paying sufficient attention to the 
problems of economic management and public administration. 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Countries 
In spite of its liberal-economy terminology, Saudi Arabia is more typical, in 
organizational terms, of an etatist system than it is of a market-oriented one. This has, of 
course, been mainly a function of the oil boom. The country possesses an authoritative ministry 
of planning that prepares the all-important successive developmental plans. And it has 
extremely powerful ministries of Petroleum and of Industry that host dynamic technocratic 
teams which prepare general policies on the one hand and direct and control important public 
corporations on the other (e.g. in the areas of oil field development, petroleum engineering, 
refining, pipelines and gas, basic industries, petrochemicals, steel, fertilizers, etc.) [cf. Al-Farsy, 
1982: 73-111). 
The economic role of the State in Saudi Arabia is extremely important. In 1978, the 
government was responsible for 60.3 percent of gross fixed capital formation, for 61.7 percent 
of expenditure in GDP, for 48 percent of total consumption and (in 1976) for 33.3 percent of all 
national purchases [El-Mallakh, 1982: 276]. Although the development plans have declared 
that the government would undertake capital investment only "where the size of investment is 
large and beyond the capacity of private individuals", and even though the policy of 
'Saudisation' has entailed preferential incentives to Saudi rather than expatriate and foreign 
contractors [ibid: 403-8], private business is to a large extent contingent on public expenditure 
and domestic producers do not appear to be able to function without heavy subsidy from the 
government. 
The development plan is the main vehicle through which the State reshapes the 
economy, largely through public spending. The first plan (1970-75) was a rather modest 
investment programme. Planning took off after the oil boom with the second development plan 
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(1975-80) involving an expenditure of no less than SR498,230 million (about $142 billion) and 
with major features being the infrastructure and the Jubail and Yanbu' industrial cities. The 
third plan (1980-1985) was intended to shift the emphasis from the infrastructure to the 
productive sectors, including agriculture. The fourth plan (1985-89) stressed operational 
efficiency and non-oil activities, and stipulated a larger role for the private sector, but it is 
generally believed to have fallen short of its objectives. 
Saudi Arabia hosts a very large public sector that has been expanding tremendously 
since the oil boom. Several public organizations were established, especially during the 1970s, 
their number exceeding thirty by the mid-1980s. These included four public organizations in 
the area of services, ten in the area of education and training, as well as fifteen economic public 
corporations, most of which include several public companies and enterprises. The activities of 
the public corporations cover such varied areas as oil and minerals, silos, water and electricity, 
regional development, banking and investment funds, as well as a whole range of 
manufacturing, petrochemical, and construction industries [Al-Tawil, 1986: 379-84]. Heavy 
industry is almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the State-owned Saudi Arabian Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC), and oil refining in the hands of the Public Organization for 
Petroleum and Minerals (PETROMIN). 
It is no secret that the expansion of the public sector in Saudi Arabia was motivated not 
only by the need to expand industry and the infrastructure and to diversify the economy, but also 
by "the desire to redistribute part of the growing income in the form of services and public 
utilities" [Khawajkiya, 1990: 485]. Like other important oil-exporters in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia 
has been identified as an 'allocative State' that is actively involved in the circulation of 
petroleum rent. The public sector has benefited from such practices and has accumulated 
enormous liquid assets, much of them deposited abroad. The richest groups revolve around the 
royal family and a small number of often related or associated merchant families. They remain 
too dependent on the State, which continues to enjoy a high degree of budgetary autonomy, to 
be able to initiate really independent entrepreneurial activities or political demands [Luciani, 
1990: 87-93]. 
In the industrial field, the Saudi private sector is involved in the production of several 
items such as soft drinks, paper products, detergents, furniture, plastics and building products, 
and in textile manufactures and light metal industries. It makes good use of the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund which was set up by the government in the 1970s to provide interest-free 
medium- and long-term loans to the private sector. In 1984 a private sector project, the National 
Industrialization Enterprise, was established to help with the government's efforts to privatize 
industry and to promote plants using feedstock from the first generation projects of SABIC [EIU 
Saudi Arabia Country Profile, 1987/88]. By the mid-1980s the private sector was contributing 
46 percent of total fixed investments, producing 71 percent of GDP (excluding oil) and 
employing 88 percent of all manpower [Khawajkiya, 1990: 492-4]. 
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Most private sector industrial companies are fairly small in size and more concentrated 
in the area of rather similar consumer products. Most are 'personal' private companies or 
partnerships, owned and managed by the individual and his family, and very few are limited 
companies. Saudi Arabia had 7060 private companies in 1986, in addition to 297 thousand 
registered individual 'establishments' (mu'assasat fardiyya) of one sort or another, mainly 
functioning as merchant stores or small workshops. Available empirical studies indicate that 
private manufacturing firms are not particularly efficient and many are run according to rather 
primitive managerial and accounting practices [Presley, 1991: 102-141. There were only 22 
limited companies active in the industrial field in the mid-1980s, with a total capital of SR12 
billion, of which only SR5 billion were contributed by the private sector (and SR7 billion by 
SABIC and PETROMIN) [Khawajkiya, 1990: 501-21. Private sector companies are also heavily 
dependent on subsidized borrowing from state financing bodies. 
With the decline in the revenues of the oil-exporting countries from around 1982-83 
onwards, as a result of lower oil prices and reduced interest rates, even such relatively rich 
countries as Saudi Arabia were beginning to feel the need to adjust their economic policies. 
Generally speaking, however, the rate of decline in public expenditure has not matched the rate 
of decline in public revenues and in some countries, such as Kuwait and Oman, the expenditures 
continued on their rising trend. In Saudi Arabia, budgeted expenditures declined from $82.2 
billion in 1981 to $54.8 billion in 1985, but actual expenditure figures remained unknown to 
(or continued to be withhold from) even the country's public finance experts [U. 'Abd al- 
Rahman, 1988: 67-8]. It is believed, however, that new projects in Saudi Arabia were halted or 
at least slowed down, that imports were reduced and that attempts were made to constrain the 
expansion in public employment, especially of expatriates (although expenditure on salaries and 
on overall recurrent outlays has continued to grow) [ibid.: 110-26]. 
Faced with a substantial decline in foreign receipts, virtually all oil-exporting countries 
have sought to reduce aggregate demand in order to limit the loss of external reserves. To this 
end, they have tried to reduce public expenditure, which for them represents the primary source 
of liquidity creation and demand growth. Whereas certain cuts in development spending were 
made possible by the near completion of major infrastructural projects, the desire to continue to 
provide some support to private, non-oil sectors and the need to sustain a country's defense 
capability, have constrained the attempt at financial retrenchment, with budget deficits 
remaining high or continuing to rise [Shaalan, 1987: 26-8]. Despite reductions in imports, the 
fall in foreign exchange earnings has resulted in most oil-exporting countries experiencing 
deficits in their current external accounts, and several have resorted to external commercial 
borrowing. The situation has not been helped by the continuation of, or even escalation in, 
private capital outflow. "Typically, private sectors are contracting sharply rather than picking 
up the slack, as had been hoped" [ibid.: 28-9]. 
As with most other countries, the call for privatization in the oil-exporting countries has 
been prompted by fiscal difficulties. With the drop in oil revenues and the difficulty of cutting 
down expenditure either on the infrastructure and defense or (more seriously from a socio- 
political point of view) on welfare services and the comprehensive employment of nationals, the 
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idea has emerged that some of the financial burden may be removed from the government by 
transferring certain economic activities to the private sector. 
In anticipation of such a transformation the Saudi Fourth Socioeconomic Development 
Plan (1984/85-1989/90) stipulated an annual growth rate of ten percent for the private sector, 
compared to -2.4 percent for the government sector. Overall, the planners projected a rise in the 
share of the private (non-oil) sector in aggregate fixed capital formation from 25.4 percent in 
1979/80 to 47.8 percent in 1989/90. The share of the government sector was projected to 
decline from 50.4 percent in 1979/80 to 27.7 percent in 1989/90 [Ministry of Planning, 1985]. 
Privatization as a public policy in Saudi Arabia involves both the consolidation of 
private sector activities in the areas in which it has already shown initiative and vitality, such as 
commerce, finance and to some extent agriculture, as well as the actual transfer of ownership 
and/or management of public enterprises to the private sector [ibid.: 17 ff]. The new 
development plan (1990-1995) stipulates a number of measures that are pertinent to the 
privatization objective, including the establishment of an organized stock market, incentives for 
new shareholding companies, and encouragement for the commercial banks to extend more 
credit for production projects [Ministry of Planning, 1989]. The management of certain public 
enterprises would be leased to the private sector, and the major State industries would be 
allowed to sell shares to the private sector. SABIC has already been selling some shares since 
1987, and some of the holding companies of the main petrochemical complex, PETROMIN, are 
to be transferred to private ownership. Experts believe that though activities such as major 
construction works and large-scale agricultural projects will continue to depend on government 
subsidization, activities such as manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, telephones and 
airlines may be ready for privatization [Ministry of Planning Workshop, 1989]. 
But is the Saudi private sector ready to step in and 'pick up the slack' resulting from the 
contraction in public investment? It should be remembered at this point that, the laissez-faire 
labels notwithstanding, public spending was indeed the principal engine of Saudi Arabia's boom 
decade, which ended in 1983. Interestingly enough, private consumption during that period "did 
not have a statistically significant impact on private investment, while direct government 
consumption provided a strong stimulus to increased private-sector capital formation". 
Furthermore, although the stimulus provided by government investment to private investors was 
rather slow in the short run, in fact it represented double the stimulus (provided by government 
consumption) in the long run [Looney, 1987/88: 65]. Despite vast amounts of public sector 
expenditure since 1973, Saudi Arabia's economic fortunes continue to be closely linked to 
continued government expenditures, which in turn continue to be heavily dependent on the 
world oil market. Given the projected state of these markets, it is unlikely that the private sector 
will be able to sustain positive overall rates of economic growth over the coming few years 
[ibid.: 74). 
In Kuwait and the UAE the pattern has been a little different since the business 
community was not overwhelmingly new as was the case in Saudi Arabia. In the UAE the 
State-engendered business community is very important but the 'continuing' commercial elite 
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(mainly of Dubai) is still quite important. In Kuwait the business bourgeoisie is still more or 
less a continuation of the older commercial community. 
Most private sector firms in Kuwait (98.8 percent) are again 'personal' companies (not 
public shareholding ones) - several being individual - or partnership-based and a few being 
limited companies. But one of the most peculiar aspects is that only 1.4 percent of the labor 
force in all private companies is native Kuwaiti, whereas Kuwaitis represented 45.9 percent of 
the labor force in the government bureaucracy in 1990. Also significant is the fact that the 
contribution of the private sector to GDP had declined from 34.5 percent in 1982 to 23.7 percent 
in 1985, and from 62.9 percent to 48 percent of the non-oil GDP [Al-Hamud, 1990: 544-7]. The 
few studies that were conducted also showed that the productivity of the private sector was 
generally poor [ibid.: 550-2]. 
The expansion in the public sector was mainly a function of the rise in oil rents, 
whereby the government not only expanded the services and the infrastructure but also 
contributed to the capital of many (formally private) companies with shares very often 
exceeding half the totals (e.g. banks, insurance companies, industrial companies and transport 
and service companies) [ibid.: 552-4]. Furthermore the government took over 33 companies 
whose owners could not finance or manage them, following the two stock exchange crises of 
1976 and 1982. 
It should be obvious that the Kuwaiti private sector continues to depend on the State 
(especially with regard to provision of the infrastructure, no- or low-interest loans, exemptions 
on imports, subsidies and special prices, customs protection, and so on) while the government is 
prepared to step in to cushion the sometimes capricious private sector for reasons pertaining to 
political survival and expediency. That is why it has become government policy to continue to 
maintain companies that do not make a profit and not to sell too many government shares on the 
stock market to the public at any one time in order not to cause a downwards trend in the market 
price of shares [Al-Watan, 11 April 1990: 1, 221. 
In the UAE, as in Kuwait, native Emiratis represent only 3 percent of the manpower in 
the private sector whereas they represent 37 percent in the government bureaucracy [Al-Shuruq, 
23 April 1992]. In such countries privatization carries with it the political risks of even more 
foreign labor which the private sector finds cheaper (and which is already 90 percent of the 
labor force in the UAE) in spite of the government's attempts at discouraging the expansion in 
foreign employment. 
Government support in the UAE for the private sector took similar if sometimes more 
personally 'generous' forms: interest-free loans and mortgages for housing and for investment, 
subsidies and price controls and very generous social allowances including gifts for marriage 
dowries and a progressive 'child benefit' system (the more you produce the higher the allowance 
per child!). Every citizen is also entitled to three virtually free pieces of land [Field, 1984]. 
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Like other oil-exporting states the UAE responded to the recession by seeking to reduce 
aggregate demand, especially that generated through government expenditure, and following the 
mid-1980s no further expansion was to take place in public employment. Fiscal retrenchment 
has been tempered, however, by a desire to continue to provide support for the State-dependent 
private sector, and by defense priorities [cf. Shaalan, 1987: 29-129]. 
It is little wonder, given all these constraints, that although governments in the Gulf 
have declared some privatization slogans, partly by way of following fashion and partly by way 
of coping with the constraints of the 'bust' years, the ability to implement any privatization 
programme has been very limited indeed. One analyst found himself able to state categorically 
and in no uncertain terms that "Privatization and liberalization programs ... failed outright in the 
so-called market economy of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates" [Chaudhry, 1991: 
1451, a statement that is perhaps rather sweeping but not altogether wide off the mark. 
One important factor deciding the likely contribution of the private sector in Saudi 
Arabia will be the degree to which the country will succeed in installing a process of 'financial 
deepening'. Given the size of the population and the infrastructure and the level of capital 
accumulation, the private sector has a potentially more important role to play in the domestic 
market, in the smaller neighboring oil-exporting countries than it does in Saudi Arabia. Much 
will depend, however, on "the ability and willingness of the commercial banks to divert assets 
from foreign to domestic lending. The country may be vulnerable to a serious liquidity crisis if 
significant increases in Euro-rates were to take place in an environment in which the 
government was unable, because of slack revenues, to significantly increase its expenditures" 
[Looney, 1987/88: 66-7]. 
It can thus be seen that the private sector in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries is 
not only financially and structurally dependent on the State Sector, but that the two sectors are 
symbiotically linked in complex ways, including on the level of personnel. Members of the elite 
are often engaged in 'public' office and in 'private' business at the same time, thus making the 
distinction between the two domains extremely difficult [Al-Nasrawi, 'Discussion' in al- 
Nasrawi, 1990: 529-30]. Given this situation, it is quite likely - paradoxical as this may seem - 
that it would be the private sector and the State's clients in the business sector who will 
constrain and slow down the move towards privatization in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. 
Conclusion 
It is often argued that several Arab countries have decided to restructure because they 
now realize that the private sector is more efficient and productive than the public sector. Yet t 
his is another area in which information is also scant: just how productive are public and private 
enterprises in the Arab countries? Productivity and effectiveness for the public sector is not 
simply profitability; but even 'simple' profitability data for public enterprises are lacking or 
difficult to obtain (sometimes for understandable 'survivalist' political reasons!) 
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The move towards privatization in both the oil-poor and the oil-rich Arab countries has 
been promoted more by a relative (and, in the case of the former group, severe) decline in 
revenues, than it has been motivated by any realization of the inefficiency of the public 
enterprises and the efficiency of private ones in the various Arab countries. The developing 
countries were prepared to take on trust the word of the early privatizers in the 'centre' (the 
United Kingdom and the United States) on this issue, as well as the assurances of the 
international organizations of globalizing capitalism. Although a few Arab experts have voiced 
some doubts and called for caution [e.g., Hafiz Mahmud, 1989; Hilan, 1989; Mahjub, 1990], 
most Arab writings on privatization have taken it for granted that private is more rational and 
efficient than public, and have proceeded ipso facto to suggest strategies and modalities for 
implementing such a policy [e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Abu Ali, 1989; Anani and Khalaf, 1989; 
Al-Saigh and Buera, 1990]. 
In most cases, the managerial argument over efficiency has been confused with (or else 
has tended to overshadow) the macro-economic argument over development. The most 
profitable enterprises are not always the most conducive to overall national development. Even 
some of the proponents of privatization would concede that the State had acted in several Arab 
societies as a real 'agent of development' on the macro-economic level, and that several actual 
choices of projects for public investment cannot be described as irrational. Even now, the 
privatization craze notwithstanding, few people who are familiar with conditions in the Arab 
countries would suggest a total withdrawal of the State from the economic arena; although 
several would perhaps argue that the State should have "a much more vital role to play as a 
promoter of business, animateur, than as a business entrepreneur" [cf. e.g., Harik, 1990: 29]. 
Privatization within post-Socialist or post-populist regimes usually entails three 
processes, which are sometimes achieved in successive stages as follows: (a) managerialism 
within the public sector; (b) commercialization of the State economic sector; and (c) 
concessions to, and partnerships with, international capital (e.g., joint ventures). 
Policies of economic adjustment are not purely technical or financial in nature, but by 
necessity carry with them important social outcomes and therefore require significant shifts in 
political coalitions. A familiar pattern of political coalition in industrializing Third World 
societies has been represented by a 'populist' coalition centered around the military, the techno- 
managerial elite of the public sector, and organized labor. This is the political corollary of the 
famous import-substitution strategy, with its strongly industrial and urban bias and its elaborate 
'social welfare' policy. Once in serious crisis, a State that is dominated by such a coalition may 
either attach top priority to the imperative of 'industrial deepening' and thus opt for an open 
bureaucratic-authoritarian model, or it may follow a less radical and more incremental set of 
measures in an attempt to respond to a developmental crisis that often represents itself most 
severely in the financial sphere. 
An initial response to the fiscal crisis of the State will often make itself felt through a 
number of 'belt-tightening' and 'economizing' measures that are usually followed on an ad hoc 
basis and that sometimes include 'more of the same' remedies. This may involve an 
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intensification of import controls, increased reliance on administrative allocation of resources, 
and the application of a number of interventionist policies designed to widen the gap between 
domestic prices and world prices. It is usually only when such countries discover that the 
consequences of such an approach are ultimately unsustainable, that they delve into the short- 
term 'stabilization programmes' (sponsored by the IMF), and the longer term 'structural 
adjustment' programmes (sponsored by the World Bank) [cv. Da Silva Lopes, 1989]. 
Short-term stabilization programmes, typified by the IMF 'stand-by arrangements' are 
oriented primarily to the quick reduction of deficit, by cutting domestic demand or controlling 
its expansion. They involve expenditure-reducing policies and expenditure-switching policies 
(i.e., stimulating the production of exportable and importable goods and changing the demand 
patterns in favor of goods that do not enter into international trade). These programmes are 
usually based on a small number of instruments: ceilings to the expansion of domestic credit and 
to public sector borrowing, rises in interest rates, exchange rate depreciation, and sometimes 
wage controls and the adjustment of some key prices [Da Silva Lopes, 1989: 22-30]. The 
potential social beneficiaries in this stage would be agricultural exporters, private and perhaps 
public exporters of manufactured goods, the tourist sector and migrant workers who can convert 
their earnings at the new devalued exchange rates. Among the main potential losers would be 
public sector enterprises which will suffer from reduced investment and expenditure and from 
the restrictions on imports [Waterbury, 1989: 56-7]. 
Programmes of structural adjustment are more ambitious in that they do not rely merely 
on demand management but are oriented more towards improving the conditions of supply and 
the allocation of domestic resources, and towards "institutional transformations which may 
contribute to reinforcing the growth potential and to reduce the vulnerability to external shocks 
by reducing external payments imbalances" [Da Silva Lopes, 1989: 22-3]. The measures 
involved in this phase are more varied and profound but they certainly include reduction in 
consumers' subsidies, deregulation of agricultural producers' prices and of some industrial 
prices, as well as the liberalization of trade and of the exchange rates. Very often they also 
include a certain 'privatization' drive; i.e., a move towards increased private management and/or 
ownership of enterprises and a general encouragement of private investment within the 
economy, especially in the export-oriented sectors. 
The likely social beneficiaries of this phase are the agricultural sector in general and 
exporters in particular, along with some public enterprises that sell mainly to the domestic 
market, after all of them have benefited from the 'streamlining' necessitated by the reduction in 
public investment flows. This phase is likely to have a "moderate or intermediate impact" on 
public or private import-substituting industries, since they will experience rising costs of 
domestic inputs, and probably of wage bills, which may or may not be offset by easier 
borrowing and deregulation of prices. Those engaged in the export of manufactured goods will 
also experience a rise in the cost of labor and domestic inputs [Waterbury, 1989: 56-7]. 
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What are the coalition shifts that are likely to result from such changes? 
First and perhaps most consistently, organized labor cannot expect a continuation of the 
symbolically favored, if institutionally incorporated, status that it enjoyed in earlier, more 
populist times. Unprecedented workers' strikes may start to take place as happened, for 
example, in Egypt and Tunisia. Even the professional syndicates and associations may show 
signs of resistance (as occurred in Sudan) or of defiance and restlessness (as took place in 
Egypt). More spectacular protests against the declining standard of living and the removal of 
basic subsidies tend to come from the urban sub-proletariat and lumpenproletariat, as has been 
seen in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and elsewhere. Organized labor can be drawn into some of the 
protest actions that are best expressed by the urban sub-proletariat and lumpenproletariat: this is 
illustrated by the 1978 events in Tunisia that resulted in the creation of an ambivalent 
relationship between the government and the once organically incorporated trade union 
federation, the UGTT [Waterbury, 1989: 57-601. The possibility of more militant labor action 
might have been higher in several countries, had the safety valve of work opportunities in the 
oil-exporting countries not existed. Migrant labor constitutes an important financial factor 
which has no formal organized representation in the emerging coalitions but which is potentially 
of great economic and social (and subsequently political) impact. 
In most countries, the military retain their membership of the new coalitions, although 
often in a somewhat adjusted capacity. Armies continue to acquire the lion's share of public 
expenditure, and in some cases to have exclusive control of their own financial affairs. Some 
armies have also expanded in 'civilian' economic activities (e.g., in Egypt, Syria, etc.). Even in 
Tunisia, where the military were previously subordinate to the civilian government, the arrival 
of General Zain al-'Abidin Bin 'Ali to power signals a likely enhancement of the political status, 
if not of the political role, of the military. While the conventional civil service continues, 
despite its huge size, to be of limited political importance, the same cannot be said of the public 
sector management. The managers and technocrats of the state enterprises and economic 
organizations continue to carry significant political weight in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, 
Iraq, and elsewhere. Although part of the technocracy has gone private, there continues to be 
many technocrats who still regard their life careers as being closely tied to the future of the 
public sector. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis and case studies? One 
general conclusion is that both the expansion and the contraction of the public economic sector 
have been correlated with the availability of liquid capital. The availability of capital may be 
domestically-based (e.g. nationalizations or 'agricultural squeeze') or externally-based (e.g. oil 
rents, aid and remittances). The tightening of finance also corresponds to domestic signals 
(such as declining revenues in the public enterprises and growing deficits in the state budget), 
and/or with external signals coming from creditors, international financial organizations, trade 
partners and potential investors. 
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In most cases the move towards privatization as a way of overcoming the 'financial 
crisis of the State' takes the form of a public policy; i.e., one that is initiated by the State 
(sometimes in collaboration with international capital) for its own reasons, rather than under 
pressure from the private sector. If it is in a state of readiness to do so, the private sector may, 
of course, pick up on the process and push ahead with it. The pace and intensity of privatization 
will, however, depend (a) on the degree to which capital accumulation has been both extensive 
and internally-oriented; and (b) on the degree to which both the State bourgeoisie and the 
private bourgeoisie find it useful (safe) to seek further autonomy from each other. 
It is surmised from the case studies that privatization slogans and appearances 
notwithstanding, actual privatization remains rather limited and that the Arab State is not really 
about to withdraw from the economy. Privatization is still basically a public policy that is 
pursued by the State with reluctance and caution largely for its own purposes; it has not yet 
become a dynamic process whose initiative is taken by the private sector itself. If the private 
sector is gaining it is not because of its initiative, drive and organization, nor is it because the 
ruling elites have decided sincerely to hand the economy over to it; rather it is mainly because 
the State can no longer, given its chronic 'fiscal crisis', continue with its etatist and its welfarist 
policies at the same time. In other words, the private sector may end up growing 'by default', so 
to speak, although the proportions, timings and modalities vary depending on a number of key 
factors. These include the solidity and coherence of the State machinery; the strength and 
autonomy of the labor movement; the attitude of the public sector managers and partly 
appartchiks; the vitality and capabilities of the domestic business community; the degree to 
which the government's intervention might or might not have 'crowded out' the private sector; 
and last but not least the levels and patterns of external pressures/temptations exercised on the 
State by international organizations and by globalizing capitalism. 
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